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UTILIZATION OF THE DISCLAIMER AS AN
EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DEFINE THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Michael A. Chagares*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The law pertaining to the relationship between the employer
and employee has changed markedly over the past fifteen years.1
Courts, as well as legislatures, have become increasingly more receptive to claims by terminated employees that they have been wrongfully discharged. 2 With these employees advancing a number of theories in support of their claims, employers not only defend their
actions but also attempt to avoid future disputes. A frequent allegation associated with wrongful termination actions is that employees
were deprived of something, such as employment for a specific period, which was a term of the relationship. This Article examines the
evolution of the law governing the duration of the employment relationship and suggests that employers should use disclaimers as a
means to define the terms of the relationship between themselves and
their employees. In addition, this Article proposes a number of
* B.A. Gettysburg College, 1984; J.D. Seton Hall University, 1987. The author is associated with the law firm of McCarter & English, Newark, New Jersey.
1. See A. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL
DOCTRINE 9 (1987) (stating that the traditional employment at will doctrine has eroded over
the last fifteen years); see also Barger v. General Elec. Co., 599 F. Supp. 1154, 1157-58 (W.D.
Va. 1984) (discussing the history of the employment at will doctrine and subsequent recent
changes); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922
(1981) (discussing the history of the law of the employment at will relationship and recent
statutory limitations placed upon the employer's power of dismissal); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 132, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (indicating that the area of law governing
employer and employee relations is changing substantially and rapidly).
2. See generally Abbasi, Hollman & Murrey, Employment at Will: An Eroding Concept in Employment Relationships, 38 LAB. L.J. 21 (1987) (examining recent judicial and
legislative restrictions on the employment at will doctrine). As a result, there has been a substantial increase in the number of wrongful discharge actions. Id. at 21; see also A. HILL,
supra note 1, at 9-10 (stating that "[m]ore often now than ever before, these discharged atwill employees are taking their claims to court" and providing a graph illustrating the sharp
increase in wrongful discharge litigation beginning in 1982).
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guidelines to foster effective utilization of disclaimers.3
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL RULE

During the United States' early nationhood, the country gener-

ally followed the established English presumption that the employment relationship consisted of one year employment periods.' In
1877, however, an American legal theorist, H.G. Wood, published a
treatise which altered the way both American employers and employees viewed the employment relationship. Wood argued that
there was a presumption that no duration existed for the employ-

ment relationship. 6 The rule Wood advocated soon became known as
the "employment at will" rule.7 Under the rule, either the employee
or employer could end the employment relationship whenever he
chose to do so." The employment at will rule gained acceptance in
the United States since it was consistent with the then-popular idea

of "freedom of contract." 9
After the advent of Wood's treatise, courts began to utilize the
employment at will rule.10 One court defined the rule in the follow3. The predominant focus of this Article is the relationship between the employer and
the private sector, non-unionized employee.
4. This presumption governed, at a minimum, agricultural and domestic service hirings.
W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 20-21
(1985); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.

118, 122 (1976). The English durational presumption may be traced back to the Statute of
Laborers, which was enacted to ensure economic stability in Middle Ages England. See M.
FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW 12 (1953); see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *425 (stating that "[i]f the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law

construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity ....").
5. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
6. See id. at 272 (stating that in the United States "the rule is inflexible, that a general
or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."). Several commentators have
asserted that the cases Gray cites in support of his rule did not actually support the rule. See,
e.g., H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 10 n.58 (2d ed. 1987); Feinman,

supra note 4, at 126; Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual
Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082, 1083
n.7 (1984).
7. See Summers, supra note 6, at 1083.
8. See H.G. WOOD, supra note 5, at 272.
9. See H. PERRITT, supra note 6, at 8-9; Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge
Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 469-70 (1980);

Forbes & Jones, A Comparative, Attitudinal, and Analytical Study of Dismissal of At-Will
Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. L.J. 157, 158-59 (1986); Note, Protecting Employees at
Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931,
1933 (1983) (noting that the rule's adoption "paralleled the growing acceptance of freedomof-contract ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.").
10. See A. HILL, supra note 1,at 7; Feinman, supra note 4, at 126. The employment at
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ing manner: "All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many
or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for a cause morally

wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."11 Early courts
construing the employment at will rule abided by it strictly, sometimes with inequitable results. 2 Hence, attempts to alter at-will em3
ployment relationships were met with disapproval by the courts.'
Courts commonly held modifications to the at-will employment contract unenforceable by reason of indefiniteness, 14 lack of mutuality, 5
will rule gained recognition by the United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908). The Court noted that:
it is not within the functions of government-at least in the absence of contract
between the parties-to compel any person in the course of his business and against
his will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel any person,
against his will, to perform personal services for another. The right of a person to
sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the
right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept
such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the employ6 to quit the
service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employ6.
Id. at 174-75. The Supreme Court also recognized the validity of the at-will doctrine in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), where it held that a statute which restricts employer's
hiring and firing decisions is unconstitutional. See id. at 26.
II. Payne v. Western & AtI. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
12. See Abbasi, Hollman & Murrey, supra note 2, at 23 (stating that "[c]ourts embraced, repeated, and were adamant in their application of the employment-at-will rule in the
early part of this century" and that the consequences of the at-will doctrine were often "harsh
and unhumanitarian"); see, e.g., Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)
(holding that a laborer could be discharged at any time without liability on the part of the
employer where the laborer was allegedly discharged because he refused to vote for certain
candidates in a city election); Bird v. J.L. Prescott Co., 89 N.J.L. 591, 593, 99 A. 380, 381
(1916) (finding that a corporation could legally discharge an employee where the corporation
succeeded a co-partnership which had offered the employee a job for life to induce the employee, who had been injured on the job, to forbear bringing a lawsuit); Martin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 120-21, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895) (finding employment at will
although the plaintiff-employee had understood his position to be a yearly contract which had
been renewed for the past eight years).
13. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (listing reasons why the courts disapproved alterations); see also H. PERRITr, supra note 6, at 10 (stating that "many American
jurisdictions came, in time, to treat the presumption of an employment at will as precluding
enforcement of an informal employment contract in most cases.").
14. See, e.g., Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889); Savarese v. Pyrene
Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237 (1952); Bird v. J.L. Prescott Co., 89 N.J.L. 591, 99 A. 380
(1916).
15. See, e.g., Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Schoen v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 103 III. App. 2d 197, 243 N.E.2d 31 (1968); Price v. Western Loan & Say.
Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677 (1909). Mutuality of obligation indicates "'that both parties are
bound or neither [is] bound,'" Meadows, 222 F.2d at 348 (quoting Farmer's Educ. & Coop.
Union v. Langlois, 258 III. App. 522, 534 (1930)), and if "a contract is incapable of being
enforced against one party, that party is equally incapable of enforcing it against the other."
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or lack of independent consideration. 6
Within the last fifteen years, numerous courts and commenta-

tors have argued that the employment at will rule has a harsh impact on the employee.'" These authorities have contended that the

reasons for adopting the rule during the industrial revolution are not
justified today,' 8 since the employer and employee held equal bargaining positions during the early part of the century while today the

employer has the more favorable bargaining position.1" As a result of
this perceived inequality, employees, as well as courts and legislatures, have begun to find ways to modify the application of the employment at will rule in certain circumstances.20
Various legislative bodies have sought to give the employee
greater protection against the sometimes harsh effects of the employ-

ment at will rule. For instance, in 1964, Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act,2 ' which protects employees from discharge
by reason of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id. The Meadows court found that since the employee had a right to terminate his employment at any time, the employer could not enforce the contract against him and the contract
was thus lacking in mutuality. Id. at 348-49. This lack of mutuality also precluded the employee from enforcing the contract against the employer. Id.
16. See, e.g., Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955); Degen v. Investors
Diversified Servs., 260 Minn. 424, 110 N.W.2d 863 (1961); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (en bane).
17. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 449, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 725 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 290, 491 A.2d 1257, 1260,
modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
219, 226, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1984) (en bane); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1405-06 (1967); DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee
Rights to Job Security and FringeBenefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L. 1, 2 (1981); Lopatka, The
Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue
of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Cleary, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 449, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725; Woolley, 99 N.J.
at 291-92, 491 A.2d at 1261-62; Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 226, 685 P.2d at 1086; Blades,
supra note 17, at 1418-19; DeGiuseppe, supra note 17, at 16; Lopatka, supra note 17, at 5; see
also Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 66, 417 A.2d 505, 509 (1980) (stating
that "[t]he twentieth century has witnessed significant changes in socioeconomic values that
have led to reassessment of the common law rule ....Growth in the number of employees has
been accompanied by increasing recognition of the need for stability in labor relations.").
19. See Blackburn, supra note 9, at 470; Blades, supra note 17, passim; Lopatka, supra
note 17, at 5; Marrinan, Employment at-Will: Pandora'sBox May Have an Attractive Cover,
7 HAMLINE L. REv. 155, 158-59 (1984).
20. See infra notes 21-94 and accompanying text (discussing ways to limit the impact of
the employment at will rule in certain situations).
21. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
22. Id. § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. at 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)).
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Additionally, Congress has enacted legislation protecting specific
groups of people, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,2" the Fair Labor Standards Act 24 and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. 5 State legislatures have similarly enacted such
2
statutes. 3
The judiciary has also played a significant role in limiting the
impact of the employment at will rule. Over the past fifteen years
courts have been more willing to examine the claims of employees
disgruntled over their termination. 7 Courts have recognized three
major theories in allowing recovery for "wrongful" termination: the
public policy exception,28 breach of the covenant of good faith and
0
fair dealing 29 and the implied-in-fact contract limitation.3
A. Public Policy Exception
Courts adopting the public policy exception to the employment
at will rule allow a remedy for a termination when an employee is
fired for acting in a way that is consistent with some recognized public policy. In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,"1 the California district court became the forerunner in recognizing the public policy exception. In Petermann, the plaintiff was
employed by the defendant union as a business agent. 2 Upon being
subpoenaed to testify before a committee of the California legislature, the employee was allegedly instructed by his superior to make
false statements.3 The employee disregarded this command, and testified truthfully.34 The employee was discharged the day after his
testimony,35 and subsequently brought an action seeking damages for
23. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621624 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
24. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).
25. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 4, at
425-29 (listing other federal statutory limitations on the employment at will rule).
26. See W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 4, at 430-62 (listing state statutory
limitations on the employment at will rule).
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
31. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
32. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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his alleged wrongful discharge. 6
Upon reviewing the facts in Petermann, the court initially noted

that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and could normally be terminated for any reason. 87 The court acknowledged, however, that
public policy considerations could limit an employer's right to fire.38
To support its recognition of a non-statutory exception to the em-

ployment at will rule, the court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise
would be without reason and contrary to the spirit of the law." 39 The

court, turning to the facts before it, sustained the plaintiff's action
for wrongful discharge, positing that if it acted otherwise, the court
would be allowing an employee's employment to be conditioned upon
the perpetration of a felonious act.40 Such a situation, the court
noted, would "serve to contaminate the honest administration of
'4 1

public affairs."
The public policy exception appears to be the most recognized
limitation to the employment at will rule.4 1 Courts have varied, however, as to the sources of public policy for this exception. Some have
43
found that public policy flows only from statutes and constitutions,
while others have found that sources of public policy might also include administrative rules, decisions or regulations4 4 and judicial decisions.4 One court even recognized that "public policy concerns
what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State col-

lectively.

'46

The public policy exception is successfully utilized, for

36. Id. The plaintiff sought two forms of relief. The first was declaratory, stating that he
was wrongfully discharged. The second was for payment of his accrued wages. Id.
37. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. The plaintiff was an employee at will since his employment contract did not specify any term. Id.
38. Id. The court conceded, though, that "'[t]he term 'public policy' is inherently not
subject to precise definition.'" Id. (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n,
41 Cal. 2d 567, 575, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (1953)).
39. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Forty-three states have recognized the public policy exception. See infra p. 399 app.
at 405 (listing state-by-state recognition of limitations and exceptions to the rule).
43. See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666
S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512
(1980).
45. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 379, 710 P.2d
1025, 1034 (1985) (en banc); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d
625, 631 (1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081,
1089 (1984) (en banc).
46. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
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example, when employees are fired for "whistleblowing" on their employer's illegal actions, 47 for failing to commit illegal acts,", and for
exercising their statutory rights.49
B.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing

Another limitation to the employment at will rule occurs when
courts find that an employer, through its termination of an employee,
has breached an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment contract. In Fortune v. National Cash Regis-

ter Co.,50 for instance, the plaintiff was an employee of the National
Cash Register Company for nearly twenty-five years.51 The plaintiff
was employed under a "salesman's contract," which granted him a
fixed weekly salary plus a bonus based upon a percentage of sales

occurring within the employee's assigned territory.52 The contract,
however, was terminable at-will. 53 In November 1968, the plaintiff
was instrumental in the sale of five million dollars of cash registers,
which produced commissions worth over $92,000. 5" Before the plaintiff could collect his full commission, however, he was terminated.55
Subsequently, the employee instituted a suit alleging that he
(1981).
47. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 480, 427 A.2d 385, 389
(1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 134, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880-81
(1981); Watassek v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 143 Mich. App. 556, 564, 372 N.W.2d
617, 621 (1985); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978).
48. See, e.g, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985) (en banc) (refusing to commit an act that may violate indecent exposure statutes);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)
(refusing to engage in price fixing); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich.
App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refusing to alter state mandated pollution control reports);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978) (refusing to perform medical procedures for which employee was not licensed); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (refusing to pump bilges into the water illegally).
49. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(refusing to take polygraph test); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, 192 Cal. App. 2d
793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (joining a union); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11.2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978) (filing a workmen's compensation claim); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.
App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976) (same).
50. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
51. Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
52. Id. at 97-98, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. The bonus was to be computed as a percentage of
the price of products sold within the territories assigned to the employee, whether or not the
sale was made by him. Id.
53. Id. at 97, 364 N.E.2d at 1253. The contract was terminable at-will upon written
notice by either the employer or employee. Id.
54. Id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
55. Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1254.
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was terminated in bad faith, which constituted a breach of his employment contract. 8 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
in holding for the plaintiff, found that although the plaintiff was an
employee at will, the employer breached an "implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing" by terminating him.5 7 Noting the existence of this covenant in other contracts, the court perceived no reason why the covenant should not be implied in employment contracts. 8 The court reasoned that implication of this covenant was
consistent with the general policy "that parties to contracts and commercial transactions must act in good faith toward one another.""9
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the least
recognized limitation to the employment at will rule.60 One reason
for this lack of recognition is that the scope of the covenant is incapable of precise definition."' In addition, courts are in conflict as to
whether a breach of this implied duty sounds in tort or contract
law.6 2
C.

Implied-in-Fact Contract Limitation

The final theory courts have utilized in allowing relief for employees claiming wrongful discharge is the implied-in-fact contract
limitation.6 3 Courts adopting this limitation have allowed various
promissory terms communicated between the parties to supplement
and alter the at-will employment contract. 64 These terms are gener56. See id. at 97, 364 N.E.2d at 1253.
57. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
58. See id. at 102-04, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57.
59. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
60. Only nine states have recognized the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
as a limitation to the employment at will rule. See infra p. 399 app. at 405 (listing state-bystate recognition of limitations and exceptions to the rule).
61. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982) (referring to the concept as "amorphous"); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,
227, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1984) (en banc) (adopting the Parnarcourt's reasoning); W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, supra note 4, at 63 (noting that courts adopting this limitation may be
"cut adrift on a sea of boundless discretion .... ).
62. Compare Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984) (holding that a breach of covenant sounds in tort) and Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont.
178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982) (same) with Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429
N.E.2d 21 (1981) (holding that a breach of covenant sounds in contract) and Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (same).
63. Forty-one states have recognized this limitation to the employment at will rule. See
infra p. 399 app. at 405 (listing state-by-state listing of recognition of limitations and exceptions to the rule).
64. See infra notes 65-94 and accompanying text.
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ally representations of either job security65 or procedures to be taken
before termination."6 Communications modifying the at-will term
have included oral assurances,6

7

pre-employment statements 8 and

manuals.6 9

employee policy
Courts that enforce these communications do so in one of two
ways: through equitable principles 70 or through traditional contract
analysis.71 The former approach was utilized by the Michigan Su65. See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779 F.2d I01 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving
an oral lifetime employment contract); Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, 663
P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983) (involving an offer of a job that could last until plaintiff reached
retirement age).
66. See, e.g., Duldulao v. Saint Mary Nazareth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505
N.E.2d 314 (1987) (involving an employee handbook which set forth procedural rights that
employees were entitled to prior to termination); Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357
S.E.2d 452 (1987) (same).
67. See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving
an oral lifetime employment contract); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (involving oral statement to plaintiff that she could only be terminated for cause);
Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983) (involving
an oral lifetime employment contract); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135
(Me. 1977) (involving an oral promise of employment for a definite term).
68. See, e.g., Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(involving a provision in the employment application); Integon Life Ins. Corp. v. Vandegrift,
11 Ark. App. 270, 669 S.W.2d 492 (1984) (involving letter sent by employer to plaintiff prior
to their entering into an employment contract).
69. Employee policy manuals appear to be the most common sources of promises implied-in-fact in the employment contract. See, e.g., Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp.,
141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Duldulao v. Saint Mary Nazareth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill.
2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987); Small v. Springs Indus., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452
(1987); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (en banc);
Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
70. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986); Arie v. Intertherm,
Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also infra notes 72-82 (discussing the use of
equitable principles in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield). A number of courts have held
that employer communications may be enforceable using the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
See, e.g., Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Moore v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 155 Ill. App. 3d 781, 508 N.E.2d 519 (1987); Mers v. Dispatch Printing
Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.E.2d 150 (1985). To be successful under this doctrine, it must
be shown that "the employer should reasonably have expected the employee to consider [the
communication] as a commitment from the employer to follow [its terms], that the employee
reasonably relied on [the terms] to his detriment and that injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of [the terms]." Continental, 731 P.2d at 712.
71. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Johnston v. Panhandle Coop.
Ass'n, 225 Neb. 732, 408 N.W.2d 261 (1987); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J.
284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); see also infra notes 83-94
(discussing the court's use of contract principles in Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.). This
author has previously argued that a unilateral contract analysis should be the chief approach
courts utilize when enforcing employer promises. See Comment, Limiting the Employment-at-
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preme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield. 2 In that
case, the plaintiff, Charles Toussaint, was employed by Blue Cross in
a management position.73 Upon commencing work, the plaintiff received a personnel policy manual from his employer.7 4 Within the
manual was a statement that the employer would terminate its employees "for just cause only."'75 After working for the employer for
five years, Toussaint was fired, without cause.7 6 Subsequently, he instituted an action against Blue Cross alleging wrongful termination.7 7 The basis of the plaintiff's position was that, although no express contract was executed, the personnel policy manual
communicated an enforceable provision of termination only for just
78

cause.

Although the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged prior law
that strictly adhered to the employment at will rule, it adopted the
plaintiff's theory and held that he stated a viable cause of action.7 9
In recognizing that an employer's statements of job security could
effectively limit the at-will status of an employee, the court opined
that it was simply enforcing "an employee's legitimate expectations." 80 To support its holding, the court noted that the effect of an
employer's promulgation of a policy manual was its "secur[ing] an
orderly, cooperative and loyal work force." 81 Thus, the court was
Will Rule: Enforcing Policy Manual Promises Through Unilateral Contract Analysis, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 465 (1986) (authored by Michael A. Chagares). This approach has been
taken by an increasing number of courts. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512
So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Continental Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Johnston v. Panhandle Coop.
Ass'n, 225 Neb. 732, 408 N.W.2d 261 (1987); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J.
284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569
P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).
72. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
73. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
74. Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884. The document was entitled the "Supervisory Manual." Id. at 597 n.5, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5.
75. Id. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
76. Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 595, 597 n.5, 292 N.W.2d at 883, 884 n.5. The court noted that the
plaintiff testified on cross-examination that he felt he had an employment contract and that
the pertinent sections of the Supervisory Manual were part of his contract. Id. at 597 n.5, 292
N.W.2d at 884 n.5.
79. See id. at 598-99, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
80. Id. at 614, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
81. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The court further noted that "the employer [chose],
presumably in its own interest, to create an environment in which the employee believes that,
whatever the personnel policies and practices, they are established and official at any given
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similarly obliged to construe the policy manual to the employee's
benefit.8 2
In Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized the implied-in-fact contract limitation
to the employment at will rule, but utilized a traditional contract
analysis as the basis for the limitation. In 1969, Richard Woolley
was hired by Hoffman-La Roche in its engineering department.84
Shortly after the employee began work, he received from the company a personnel policy manual85 which set forth certain termination
procedures and outlined possible causes for termination.86 After nu87
merous promotions, Woolley was terminated without cause.
The employee subsequently instituted an action claiming that
the employer breached the employment contract because it had not
fired the employee for one of the delineated causes, nor had it followed its termination procedures as set forth in the manual.88 The
Woolley court, utilizing unilateral contract principles, found that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action. 89 First, the court examined the
facts to find that the policy manual created an offer to enter into a
unilateral contract.9 0 To support its finding, the court noted the circumstances in the work forum and the manual itself, which had "all
of the appearances of corporate legitimacy."'" Since a collective bargaining agreement did not exist at the employer's plant and the
promises in the manual were specific, the court found that the employee could reasonably believe that the manual was intended to be
an offer of the terms of his employment.92 In addition, the court
found that the employee accepted the offer by his continued work for
the defendant. 93 Finally, the court concluded that the employee's
performance of his job, when he was not bound to continue, constituted valid consideration.94
time, purported to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each employee." Id.
82. See id.
83. 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
84. 99 N.J. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 310-13, 491 A.2d at 1271-73.
87. See id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.

88. Id. at 286-87, 491 A.2d at 1258.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 297-305, 491 A.2d at 1264-69.
See id. at 298-300, 491 A.2d at 1264-66.
Id. at 299, 491 A.2d at 1265.
See id. at 298-300, 491 A.2d at 1265-66.
See id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267.
See id.
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EMPLOYER USE OF DISCLAIMERS

A disclaimer is a denial or disavowal of certain specified conditions.95 In the employment context, the disclaimer may be used to
assist in defining the terms of the relationship between the employee
and employer and, therefore, to avoid post-employment conflicts between the parties.96 Although disclaimers may have significant consequences in wrongful discharge actions based upon the public policy
or implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theories,9 7 the remainder of this Article deals with conflicts pertaining to the impliedin-fact contract limitation.
With the movement of the courts toward enforcing many types
of promissory communications between the employer and employee,
it is necessary to consider why an employer would wish to describe
the circumstances surrounding employment and thereby risk liability. The answer, in brief, is that such descriptions, couched in promissory or more commonly non-promissory terms, are invaluable to
the maintenance of employment relations." Published employee
manuals or handbooks written in non-promissory language, for in95.

See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 645 (1986).

96. See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (discussing the usefulness of disclaimers in the employment context).
97. An argument in favor of the effectiveness of disclaimers in precluding the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is that parties should have the opportunity to contract
as to the exact terms of the employment relationship. See Lopatka, supra note 17, at 26.
Whereas some may argue that a disclaimer of this covenant is unconscionable, courts have
been firm in ruling that the disclaimer, as used in the employment relation, is not unconscionable. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text. Hence, there has been support for the
notion that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be disclaimed, at least
where the covenant's purported breach is viewed as contract-based. See, e.g., Hughlett v.
Sperry Corp., 650 F. Supp. 312, 315 (D. Minn. 1986); Maxwell v. Sisters of Charity, 645 F.
Supp. 937, 939 (D. Mont. 1986); Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852-53 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Chamberlain v. Bissell, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067, 1078-79 (W.D. Mich. 1982); P.
WEINER, S. BOMPEY & M. BRITTAIN, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS: A PREVENTIVE APPROACH 96 (1986); Note, Advice to California Employees: An Overview of Wrongful Discharge Law and How to Avoid Potential Liability, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 185, 195 (1985)
(authored by Teresa Howell Sharp).
The effect of disclaimers on tort-based wrongful discharge actions based upon public policy and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theories may be weaker, as courts are
less likely to enforce disclaimers when they involve tort obligations. See Note, Protecting at
Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1816, 1843 n.151 (1980). But see Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d
1086, 1089 (Miss. 1987) (suggesting that a disclaimer is likely to be effective regarding tortbased claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
98. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of disclaimers on the employment relationship).
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stance, are of substantial benefit to the employer.9 9 A reason for the
great value of these non-promissory communications is that they are

excellent informational tools.Y00 They can delineate appropriate and
inappropriate conduct in the workplace, explain the structure of the
employer's operations and present the philosophy of the business. 10 '
As a result, these communications can assist in lessening the perception of arbitrariness and aid in preserving more order and stability in
the employment relation. 02 Employee manuals or handbooks written
in non-promissory language are additionally useful in building a
favorable image for the employer. 103 Indeed, courts have recognized
the benefits not only to the employer, but also to the employee, in
promulgating these types of communications, and have been adamant in encouraging their use.'
The disclaimer is useful in the employment context since it permits employers choosing to promulgate statements pertaining to the

employment relation, as well as those who do not so choose, to identify what has not been promised as a term of the relation. 0 5 The
forerunners in sanctioning the utilization of such disclaimers were
the Toussaint and Woolley courts. The Toussaint court suggested

that a disclaimer may be used which, for example, "explicitly provides that the employee serves at the pleasure or at the will of the
99. In addition, employers choosing to publish materials containing promissory terms
are relieved of executing separate, individual contracts for each employee which contain those
terms. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment a (1977) (discussing utility of
standarized agreements).
100. This is especially important for large employers who presumably have a lesser
amount of close contact with their employees. See Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or Implied Guarantees of Employment-Employer Beware!, 5 1L. & COM.
207, 210 (1985).
101. See generally Coombe, Employee Handbooks: Asset or Liability?, 12 EMPLOYEE
REL. LJ 4, 10-13 (1986) (discussing benefits of promulgating employee policy handbooks).
102. See Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that policy and procedure manuals can "remove an element of arbitrariness from employment relationships and thereby improve the entire atmosphere of the workplace.").
103. See Coombe, supra note 101, at 10-11.
104. See, e.g., Fink v. Revco Discount Drug Centers, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1325, 1328
(W.D. Mo. 1987) (finding that "there can be little doubt that the attempt to regularize personnel practices through the use of such handbooks is commendable."); Nork, 738 S.W.2d at
827 (stating that "[p]olicy and procedure manuals are to be commended."); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (stating that "[s]uch manuals
can be very helpful tools in labor relations, helpful to both employer and employees ...
modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
105. Indeed, this is important since "employment settings are rife with potentially actionable 'promises.'" Lopatka, supra note 17, at 17.
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employer or as long as his services are satisfactory to the em-

ployer"'106 or which makes known "that personnel policies are subject
to unilateral changes by the employer."' 0 7 Disclaimers may be used
successfully in jurisdictions, such as that in Toussaint, which enforce
employer statements through equitable principles, since the em-

ployee would have no legitimate expectation of that which is disclaimed by the employer.' 08 The Woolley court posited that "a clear
and prominent disclaimer"109 may be used which indicates "that
there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in [its
statements] .

,

*."..

Accordingly, in jurisdictions such as that in

Woolley, which enforce employer statements through traditional
contract principles, a disclaimer will evince an employer's intent not
to be bound and, thus, will render that which is disclaimed incapable
of constituting an offer of contractual
accepted."'

terms which may be

An issue which should be addressed regarding the utilization of
disclaimers, however, is whether they should be of force at all in the
employment context. This inquiry is raised as a result of arguments
that disclaimers defining the employment relationship as being terminable at-will may constitute contracts of adhesion and may be unconscionable.11 2 Courts, though, have rejected such arguments."'
106.

Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d 880,

891 n.24 (1980).
107. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
108. See Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (disclaimer precluded employee's legitimate expectation to a just cause determination
prior to termination); Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich.
1980) (same); Shelby v. Zayre Corp., 474 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Ala. 1985) (same); Castiglione
v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 339-41, 517 A.2d 786, 793-94 (1986) (same), cert.
denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). In addition, disclaimers are also effective in
jurisdictions utilizing the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce employer statements since
any reliance on such statements would be unjustified. See Therrien v. United Air Lines, 670 F.
Supp. 1517, 1523 (D. Colo. 1987); Moore v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 155 Il1.App. 3d 781, 78586, 508 N.E.2d 519, 521-22 (1987).
109. Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 285, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
110. 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271.
111. See Therrien v. United Air Lines, 670 F. Supp. 1517, 1521-23 (D. Colo. 1987);
Kulkay v. Allied Cent. Stores, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (dicta);
Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 485, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987) (dicta); see also
Comment, supra note 71, at 483-84 (discussing a disclaimer's relation to enforcement of statements through unilateral contract analysis).
112. See Steiner & Dabrow, The Questionable Value of the Inclusion of Language
Confirming Employment at-Will Status in Company Personnel Documents, 37 LAB. L.J. 639,
642 (1986); Summers, supra note 6, at 1106-07; Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at
Will: Are Disclaimers a FinalSolution?, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 564 (1987) (authored
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Adhesion contracts are normally standardized contracts wherein
a party may not obtain what he seeks unless he assents to the terms

advanced by the party preparing the documents."1 4 Although a disclaimer of, for instance, a definite term of employment"1 5 may be
standardized, it should not be considered a contract of adhesion since
it is not an exercise of contractual power to provide an unbargainedfor benefit to the employer, but rather it is a delineation of that
which the law would presume if it were left unstated-that the employment relationship is terminable at will.118
Even if the disclaimer were to be considered a contract of adhesion, it would still have force unless other factors were present to
render it invalid.1 1 7 For example, an adhesion contract found to be
unconscionable is generally unenforceable. 1 8 A contract or term is
unconscionable if it is "unreasonably favorable to [one] party" 119
by Patricia M. Lenard); see also Finkin, The Bureaucratizationof Work Employer Policies
and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 733, 750 (asserting that "[blecause employees may be
expected as a practical matter to rely upon the employer's assurances despite the disclaimer,
judicial deference to the disclaimer comes close to deference to a fraud.").
113. See, e.g., Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (recognizing that at-will employment contracts are enforceable and are not adhesion
contracts); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 341, 517 A.2d 786, 794
(1986) (noting a reluctance to strike down a voluntary agreement without a showing of "fraud,
mistake or oppression"), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987); Ledl v. Quik Pik
Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich, App. 583, 587-88, 349 N.W.2d 529, 531 (1984) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the employment agreement providing for employment at will was a contract of adhesion); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 10, 472 N.E.2d 765, 774
(1984) (asserting that disclaimers "are not necessarily antagonistic to concepts of good faith
and fair dealing .... ).

114. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 295 (1982). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment a (1977) (discussing utility of standardized
agreements).
115. Disclaimers of notice or procedures to be taken before termination of the employment relationship are other pertinent examples.
116. One commentator has noted that contracts of adhesion are exemplified by a party
using its power to deviate from generally accepted standards, as opposed to its defining those
standards. See Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1174, 1182 (1983).
117. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 819-20, 623 P.2d 165, 172, 171
Cal. Rptr. 604, 611 (1981) (asserting that "a contract of adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms unless certain other factors are present which, under established legal
rules-legislative or judicial-operate to render it otherwise." (footnotes and citations omitted)); cf. Castiglione, 69 Md. App. at 341, 517 A.2d at 794 (stating that disclaimers are
enforceable "in the absence of fraud, mistake or oppression").
118. Not all contracts of adhesion, however, are unenforceable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment a, reporter's note (1977) (discussing factors which are
relevant in determining unconscionability).
119. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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and "so unfair that enforcement should be withheld."' 20 Unconscionable terms may be terms which state that a contractual relationship
will be subject to rules contrary to those imposed by legal implication. l"1 A disclaimer such as the one previously mentioned1 22 does
not favor either party128 and is certainly fair since it explicates what
the law presumes. 24 In sum, utilization of disclaimers is a legitimate
and suggested means in which to define the terms of the employment

relationship.
IV.

A.

EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF DISCLAIMERS IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

Wording and Presentation of the Disclaimer

Employers must be sensitive to both the content of disclaimers
and the appearance of disclaimers within communications to their
employees. Both considerations are crucial to ensure the effectiveness
of disclaimers. The general rule regarding content and appearance is
25
that disclaimers must be clear as well as conspicuous."
120. Id. at 450. It must be noted that unconscionability is incapable of being precisely
defined. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-40, at 406 (3d ed.
1987); J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 4-3, at 186 (3d ed. 1988); Fort, UnderstandingUnconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 765, 766 (1978).
121. See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1763A, at 215 (3d
ed. 1972) (defining unconscionable clauses as those "altering the fundamental duties imposed
by legal implication on the drafting party by the transaction, i.e. the attempt to disclaim warranties ....").Examples of contract clauses which have been held to be unconscionable include clauses forcing a party to submit to the jurisdiction of a distant state if a suit is instituted, see, e.g., Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct.),
affd mem., 30 A.D.2d 1052, 295 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1968), and unreasonably small liquidated
damage clauses, see Varner v. B.L. Lanier Fruit Co., 370 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07, 110.
123. See generally Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984) (asserting that no inequality of bargaining position exists between employees and
employers).
124. Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 341, 517 A.2d 786, 794
(1986) (rejecting claim that enforcement of disclaimer is inequitable), cert. denied, 309 Md.
325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). Even in cases where the disclaimers are found to be unfair, they
have still been enforced. See, e.g., White v. Picker Int'l, No. 49770 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 5,
1985) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file) (enforcing disclaimer of benefits although it was found
to be unfair); Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955) (same).
The circumstances in which disclaimers will have no force will be examined throughout the
remainder of this Article.
125. See Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 548, 688 P.2d 170,
174 (1984) (en banc); Castiglione,69 Md. App. at 340, 517 A.2d at 793; Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 285, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d
515 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
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1. Wording Must be Clear.-

The disclaimer must be clear in

stating what is not intended as a term of the employment relationship.126 To avoid ambiguity, a number of guidelines should be fol-

lowed in drafting a disclaimer. For example, a disclaimer should be
clear regarding the person or persons to whom it is intended to apply. 127 In addition, a disclaimer should be drafted to reserve the right

of the employer to modify it or other communications which might
be considered to be part of the employment contract. 8 Some courts
have viewed this reservation alone as being sufficient to defeat a

wrongful discharge claim based upon an implied contract theory. 29
Finally, the disclaimer should not contain harsh language or confusing legalese. Disclaimers drafted using either of these types of terms
are certain to cause negative reactions among those covered by such
disclaimers and, therefore, will work to retard employment
relations.

30

(1984) (en banc); see also infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text (discussing the clear
wording requirement for a valid disclaimer); infra notes 146-69 and accompanying text (discussing the conspicuous presentation requirement for a valid disclaimer).
126. A reason for this emphasis on clarity is that courts generally construe an ambiguous contract against the drafter. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text (discussing
contract interpretation in the employment context).
127. See Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987) (precluding summary judgment in favor of employer where issue of material fact existed as to which
employees were covered by disclaimer); see also infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of an acknowledgment to ensure employees are aware of the disclaimer).
128. For examples of reservation clauses, see Leahy v. Federal Express Corp., 609 F.
Supp. 668, 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting from employment application which provided that
"'all terms and conditions of my employment, except to the extent covered specifically by this
contract or any other valid contract . . . shall be determined and governed by Company's
Policies and Procedures Manual, as same may be amended from time to time hereafter
....
'); Simonson v. Meader Distrib. Co., 413 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting employer's policy manual which provided that "'[m]anagement reserves the right to
make any changes at any time by adding to, deleting, or changing any existing policy.'"); Roy
v. Woonsocket Inst. for Say., 525 A.2d 915, 918 n.3 (R.I. 1987) (quoting the bank's employee
handbook which provided that "'the programs and policies described here are subject to
change at the discretion of the Bank.' ").
129. See, e.g., Link v. K-Mart Corp., 689 F. Supp. 982, 987 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Bullock
v. Automobile Club, 146 Mich. App. 711, 381 N.W.2d 793 (1985); Dudkin v. Michigan Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 127 Mich. App. 397, 339 N.W.2d 190 (1983); Brookshaw v. South St. Paul
Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Roy v. Woonsocket Inst. for Say., 525
A.2d 915, 918 (R.I. 1987).
130. In confirming the at-will status of the employee, for example, the employer may
want to mention the rights of both parties. For examples of this type of drafting, see Dell v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting employer's discipline
reference guide which provided employment "'may be terminated at any time either by the
employee or the Company ....
'); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325,
329, 517 A.2d 786, 788 (1986) (quoting hospital's employee handbook which provided that
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Employers have chosen to utilize disclaimers containing clauses
which specifically disavow the existence of employer statements as

constituting part of the employment contract.'' Where courts have
found such disclaimer clauses to be clear, they have held these
clauses effective to preclude employee claims based, for example,

upon alleged promises made in employee handbooks." 2 In Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hospital,'

an employee handbook con-

tained a disclaimer which stated "'this handbook does not constitute
an express or implied contract.' "134 The Court of Special Appeals of

Maryland found that this statement was sufficiently clear to negate
an employee's claim to pre-termination procedures based upon the
85
handbook.'
Employers have also chosen to utilize disclaimers containing
clauses which confirm the terminable at-will status of the em"'[t/he employee may separate from his/her employment at any time; the Hospital reserves
the right to do the same.' "), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987).
131. For examples of such disclaimers, see infra note 132.
132. See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1987)
(quoting the employer's Human Resources Policy Manual which provided that "'/t/hese procedures should not be interpreted as constituting an employment contract .... " (emphasis
omitted)); McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1986) (quoting the employee handbook which provided that "'[t/his Handbook and the policies contained
herein do not in any way constitute, and should not be construed as a contract of employment
between the employer and the employee, or a promise of employment.' "); Arnold v. Diet
Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 582 n.1, 746 P.2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting the
employee handbook which provided that "[t/his Handbook is not an employment contract, and
an employee can be terminated at any time."); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md.
App. 325, 329, 517 A.2d 786, 788 (1986) (quoting the employee handbook which provided
that "this handbook does not constitute an express or implied contract."), cert. denied, 309
Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). But see Harvet v. Unity Medical Center, Inc., 428 N.W.2d
574, 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a disclaimer which provided that "'[e]xceptions
to any personnel policy or procedure may be permitted on a documentation form showing good
and sufficient cause'" was ineffective to disavow formation of contract based upon employer
statements).
133. 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013
(1987).
134. 69 Md. App. at 329, 517 A.2d at 788 (quoting the hospital's employee handbook).
135. Id. at 340-41, 517 A.2d at 793-94. Other courts have made suggestions regarding
the language employers may utilize in disavowing the existence of employer statements as
being part of the employment contract. See, e.g., Kulkay v. Allied Cent. Stores, Inc., 398
N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that the employer "could have indicated
in the written personnel policy that its provisions did not constitute an offer of an employment
contract or otherwise stated that the policy did not alter the status of at-will employees.");
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1984) (en
banc) (stating that employers "can specifically state in a conspicuous manner that nothing
contained [in the employment manual] is intended to be part of the employment relationship
and are simply general statements of company policy.").
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ployee. 136 One case that illustrates the importance of clarity in this
type of disclaimer clause is Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp.13 7 In Morris, an employment agreement was signed by the employee which

provided that "'[t]he Employee's employment with the Company
may be terminated by either party at any time.' "138 Following the
employee's discharge, she instituted a wrongful discharge action al-

leging that her employment could only be terminated for good
cause.1 39 In support of her claim, the employee stated that she was

told by another employee that she would continue to have her job as
long as she executed her duties satisfactorily.1 40 The district court, in
examining the aforementioned clause, noted that the clause did not
136. Such a clause is effective if it is clearly worded. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 790 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in an
employment application which provided that "'my employment and compensation can be terminated with or without cause, and with or without notice ....
'); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761
F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in an employment
application which provided that "'employment may be terminated by the company at any
time without advance notice .... '); Leahy v. Federal Express Corp., 609 F. Supp. 668, 67172 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in an employment application
which provided that "'employment shall be for an indefinite period and may be terminated at
any time without notice ....
'); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (finding unclear and ineffective a disclaimer in an employment agreement which
provided that" '[t]he Employee's employment with the Company may be terminated by either
party at any time.' "); Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d
797, 800 n.3 (N.D. 1987) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in employer's personnel
policy handbook which provided that "'[n]o policy, benefit, or procedure implies or may be
construed to imply this Handbook to be an employment contract for any period of time.'"
(emphasis omitted)). Where such a clause is unclear, however, it renders the disclaimer ineffective. See, e.g., Loffa v. Intel Corp., 153 Ariz. 539, 544, 738 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Ct. App.
1987) (finding that the disclaimer was ineffective because the "agreement is not stated so
'clearly and conspicuously'...."); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370,
382, 710 P.2d 1025, 1037 (1985) (en bane) (finding unclear and ineffective a disclaimer in
employer's personnel policy manual which provided that exceptions to employer's disciplinary
procedure "'are not inclusive and are only guidelines.' ").
Employers may include in a disclaimer both language confirming the at-will status of the
employees and language negating the existence of the communication as being part of the
employment contract. See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir.
1987) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in employer's discipline reference guide which
included both types of language); Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 582 n.1, 746
P.2d 1040, 1041 n.1 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in an employee
handbook which provided that "'[t]his handbook is not an employment contract, and an employee can be terminated at any time.' "); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 69 Md. App.
325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986) (finding clear and effective a disclaimer in employer's policy manual
which includes both types of language), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987).
137. 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
138. Id. at 481 (quoting the employment contract).
139. Id. at 480.
140. Id. at 481.
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state whether good cause was necessary to terminate the em-

ployee.' 41 As a result of this lack of clarity, the court found that the
disclaimer could not preclude the existence of an issue of fact as to
whether the employee was properly discharged without cause. 42

Employers wishing to confirm the terminable at-will status of
their employees should include three components within their disclaimer: (1) that the employment relationship is terminable at the

will of either party, (2) that it is terminable with or without cause,
and (3) that it is terminable without prior notice. 43 For example,
one court held that a disclaimer which provided that "'employment
and compensation can be terminated with or without cause, and with
or without notice, at any time,' ",144 was sufficiently clear to preclude
the employees' claim that their employment would be terminable
45

only for good cause.
2. Presentation Must be Conspicuous.- Disclaimers, as a result
of their great importance, must be displayed prominently in communications to employees in order to be effective. 46 A conspicuous disclaimer is one presented so that a reasonable person against whom it
would operate would notice it.' 47 Hence, a disclaimer must be separated from or contrasted with the balance of an employer's commu-

nication. 48 Such a separation may be achieved, for example, by using different type for the disclaimer, such as bold, 49 capitals 50 or
italics,' 51 by underlining the disclaimer, or by printing or outlining
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. However, as is demonstrated by the quoted disclaimers in the previously cited
cases, some courts have found disclaimer clauses with less than these three components to be
clear and effective. See supra notes 135-37.
144. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting defendant's employment application).
145. Id. at 461.
146. See Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Wyo. 1988).
147. See U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1978). The issue of whether a disclaimer is conspicuous
may be treated as a question of law. See Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980.
148. See Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980 (finding a disclaimer is ineffective where it is not
separated or set off in any way to attract attention); Belfatto v. Robert Bosch Corp., No. 86-C6632 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 15, 1987) (finding a disclaimer is not conspicuous where it is in same type
as other parts of employee handbook and appears at the very end of a twelve page handbook).
149. See Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086 (Miss. 1987).
150. See Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980), overruled
on other grounds, Johnston v. Panhandle Coop. Ass'n, 425 Neb. 732, 408 N.W.2d 261 (1987);
see also Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 980 (noting that "[n]othing is capitalized that would give
notice of a disclaimer.").
151. See Kari v. General Motors Corp., 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d 222 (1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978).
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the disclaimer in a contrasting color. 52
In Jimenez v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,153 the employer included in its published standard operating procedures (SOPs) a disclaimer stating that the procedures did not constitute part of the
contract of employment. 154 The disclaimer was a part of the general
instructions of the SOPs. 55 Following the employee's termination, he
commenced a suit asserting that the SOPs created implied contract
rights. 5 ' The district court posited at the outset that a disclaimer
must be conspicuous to be effective. 15 7 Examining the disclaimer in
Jimenez, the court observed that the disclaimer was not set off in
such a way as to attract attention to it.' 58 The court noted specifically that "[n]othing [was] capitalized that would give notice of a
disclaimer. The type size equal[led] that of [any] other provision on
the same page. No border set[] the disclaimer apart from any other
paragraph on the page."' 59 As a result, the court held that the disclaimer was not conspicuous and, therefore, not effective, and
granted summary judgment that implied contract rights were created by the SOPs. 60
Employers issuing multipage communications must not only
present their disclaimers in a conspicuous manner among other statements on a page, but must also display their disclaimers on a page
which is prominent within the communication as a whole. 6 ' Courts
have held that disclaimers were effective when they have appeared
on the front page, 6 2 the inside of the cover page, 63 the second
152. See Karl, 79 Mich. App. at 93, 261 N.W.2d at 222 (outlining the disclaimer in
red); see also Jimenez, 690 F. Supp. at 680 (indicating that a border could set a disclaimer

apart from other paragraphs).
153. 690 F. Supp. 977 (D. Wyo. 1988).
154. Id. at 980.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The employer may unquestionably present its disclaimer in more than one place
within a multipage communication. See Morgan v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 867 F.2d 1023,
1029 (7th Cir. 1989) (employer presented three disclaimers in three different places within the
employee manual). Utilization of additional disclaimers may be wise when they are presented
in sections within the communication that deal specifically with the matter being disclaimed.
162. See, e.g., Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040 (Ct. App.
1987); Moore v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 155 Ill.
App. 3d 781, 508 N.E.2d 519, appeal denied,
113 IIl. Dec. 303, 515 N.E.2d 112 (1987); Taylor v. Systems Research Laboratories, Inc.,
1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2328.
163. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1986).
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page,164 or the last page of a multipage communication,' 65 as well as

in the preface or introduction of such a communication.' In Bailey
v. Perkins Restaurants,Inc.,'61 the employer presented a disclaimer
on the second
page of its employee handbook which appeared as
68
follows:

DISCLAIMER

This Employee Handbook has been drafted as a guideline for
our employees. It shall not be construed to form a contract
between the Company and its employees. Rather, it describes
the Company's general philosophy concerning policies and
procedures.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that this disclaimer was
conspicuous and, therefore, effective in precluding employees' claims
that they had a contractual right to have the employer follow its

"Progressive Discipline Policy" contained in the handbook prior to
their discharge. 9
B.

Documents in Which to Place the Disclaimer

The disclaimer should be sufficiently communicated to the employees to ensure its effectiveness. It may appear in any written
statement given to the employees17 0 or may even be communicated
verbally.' 7 1 Perhaps the most common place that the disclaimer may

be utilized is in the employee handbook. Whereas placement of the
disclaimer in this type of employer statement is encouraged, the em164. See, e.g., Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1986).
165. See, e.g., Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
166. See, e.g., Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Smith v.
St. Elizabeth Medical Center, No. CA9676 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio
library, App file).
167. 398 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1986).
168. Id. at 121.
169. Id. at 123.
170. See, e.g., Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987) (containing disclaimers in two different employee manuals and in separate executed statement); Therrien v. United Air Lines, 670 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987) (containing disclaimers in three
employment applications, in a document stating conditions of employment, and in an employee
handbook).
171. See, e.g., Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040 (Ct. App.
1987) (reading disclaimer to employee).
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ployer should have the employees receiving the handbook execute an
acknowledgment, as an additional safeguard. 172 This will help ensure
that the employee is aware of what is being disclaimed in the relationship and will greatly assist the employer in the event .of postemployment wrongful discharge litigation. 173 The acknowledgment
should contain two components: first, that the employer statement
has been received by the employee and, second, that the employee is
aware of what is being disclaimed. 74 Regarding the second element,
the disclaimer may even be repeated in the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment should state that the employer statement was read
and understood, and should be signed by the employee. 7 5 It must be
emphasized, however, that a new acknowledgment should be executed each time a term or condition of employment is either changed
or instituted.176
One option is to place the acknowledgment directly in the employer statement. 7 7 For instance, in Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society,17 8 the employer chose to distribute
a "Personnel Policy Handbook."' 7 9 At the end of the Handbook, the
following appeared: 80

172. See Dell, 811 F.2d at 973-74; McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So.
2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1986).

173. See Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 511, 738 P.2d 841, 849 (1987) (finding
that a disclaimer contained in personnel policy manual may not be effective where it had "not
been established that the disclaimer was brought to the personal attention of [the]
employees .... ").
174.

See id.

175.

For an example of such an acknowledgment, see infra text accompanying note 180.

176. See infra notes 232-55 and accompanying text (discussing assent to new or
changed employee statements).
177. See Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040 (Ct. App. 1987)
(finding a disclaimer in employee handbook effective where employee signs acknowledgment in
handbook); Nork v. Fetter Printing Co., 738 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (same); Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soe'y, 417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987) (same);
Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (same).
178.

417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987).

179. Id. at 798.
180. Id. at 800 n.3 (emphasis in original).
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A CLOSING STATEMENT
The contents of this Handbook are presented for your information.
While we fully intend to continue offering the benefits and policies
as written, The Ev. Lutheran Good Samaritan Society reserves the
right to change or revoke them, permanently or temporarily, if it is
in the best interest of the Society to do so. No policy, benefit, or
procedure implies or may be construed to imply this Handbook to
be an employment contract for any period of time.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I have read the Personnel Policies Handbook and understand the
material contained therein.
I agree to all the conditions set forth in the Handbook.
Date

Signature of Employee

The employee in Eldridge was terminated and later instituted an action against the employer contending that the Handbook was a contract which guaranteed her a right to progressive disciplinary procedures before her discharge. 8 ' The Supreme Court of North Dakota
rejected the employee's argument since the disclaimer appearing
above the employee's signature in the acknowledgment within the
Handbook operated to affirm the at-will status of the relationship
and held that the employer was not bound to adhere to various disciplinary procedures outlined in the Handbook.' 82
A preferred alternative for the placement of the acknowledgment, however, is on a sheet which may be executed and then separated from the employer's statement. 183 The advantage to this approach is in recordkeeping for the employer. The executed
acknowledgment or "sign-off sheet" may be placed in a personnel file
for the employee with the assurance that the employee is aware of
what is disclaimed in the employment relationship. The Sixth Circuit
was presented with a case involving such an acknowledgment in Dell
181. Id. at 798; see also id. at 798 n.2 (reproducing the progressive disciplinary
procedures).
182. Id. at 800.
183. See Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving a
"tear-out page" in the employer's handbook which confirms the at-will relationship and that
employees may be fired without cause); Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 97374 (6th Cir. 1987) (permitting employer to have employees execute a "sign-off' sheet which
confirms the at-will relationship and that employees may be fired without cause).
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v. Montgomery Ward & Co.'8 4 In Dell, the employee was given a
copy of the employer's Progressive Discipline Reference Guide
(PDRG) which enunciated procedures that should be taken before
discharging or disciplining an employee. 85 After the PDRG was distributed, the employee, Dell, was fired without being afforded any
pre-termination procedural protections.1 88 Subsequently, Dell instituted an action against the employer, Montgomery Ward, claiming
that the procedures stated in the PDRG had given him a legitimate
expectation that he would be terminated only for just cause, and that
the employer breached its contract by firing him without cause. 87
Dell, as well as the other persons in the employ of Montgomery
Ward, however, had executed a sign-off sheet, acknowledging that:
I have read and fully understand the rules governing my employment with Montgomery Ward. I agree that, I will conform to these
rules and regulations and, further understand and agree that my
employment is for no definite period and may, regardless of the
time and manner of payment of my wages and salary, be terminated at any time by Montgomery Ward or me, with or without
cause, and without any previous notice. Further, I understand that
no Organization Manager or Representative of Montgomery Ward
other than the President, Chief Executive Officer or Executive Vice
President of Human Resources has authority to enter into an
agreement for employment for any specified period of time or to
make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.188
The court held that Dell had not been wrongfully terminated.1 89
Noting that it would be "difficult to imagine what more the defend-

ant might have done to make it crystal clear to Dell," the court concluded that "[t]he unequivocal language in the 'sign off sheet' in this
case, which stated that the employees could be discharged 'with or
without cause and without any previous notice,' means what it says
and is binding upon the parties." 190
Employers choosing not to promulgate materials such as employment manuals must find other ways to communicate their dis184. 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987).
185. Id. at 972.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 973. Although the PDRG as well as the employer's Human Resources Policy
Manual contained similar disclaimers, Dell claimed that the employer gave the employees
"conflicting signals" which effectively negated these disclaimers. Id.
189. See id. at 974.
190. Id.
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claimers. One alternative is to have the employees execute separate
employment agreements. 9 1 These agreements need only communi-

cate the disclaimer. Such a document thus operates as an acknowledgment of the disclaimer and may192be drafted much like the acknowledgment spoken of previously.
Employers often require prospective employees to fill out applications before an employment relationship is commenced. Many employers have taken the opportunity to place a disclaimer in the application form. If the employer utilizes an application form, it is
suggested that a disclaimer be included in it.193 Such a placement is
significant for at least two reasons. First, from the standpoint of fairness, it is forthright to apprise the employee of the nature of the

relationship in which he may soon be involved. Second, such a form,
with its attendant disclaimers, may later be considered to be part of
the employee's contract of employment. 9 These two reasons for
placing disclaimers in application forms were recognized by the
Sixth Circuit in Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 95 In Reid, the plain191. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d
880, 891 n.24 (1980) (noting that the employer "can protect itself by entering into a written
contract" with an explicit disclaimer).
192. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 826 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1987) (disclaimer in
an employment contract is an effective disclaimer); Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F. Supp.
1447 (D. Wyo. 1987) (disclaimer in a separate patent agreement is an effective disclaimer);
Therrien v. United Air Lines, 670 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1987) (signing a document governing terms and conditions of employment on first day of employment is an effective disclaimer); Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (acknowledgment in an employment contract is an effective disclaimer); Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores,
Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984) (disclaimer in an employment agreement
signed over seven years after commencement of employment is an effective disclaimer). For an
example of an acknowledgment in an employee handbook, see supra text accompanying note
180.
193. Courts have found that disclaimers in such documents are effective. See, e.g.,
Radwan v. Beecham Laboratories, 850 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1988); Gianaculas v. TWA, 761
F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1985); Leahy v. Federal Express Corp., 609 F. Supp. 668 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Shelby v.
Zayre Corp., 474 So. 2d 1069 (Ala. 1985); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
194. A number of courts have reached this conclusion with respect to disclaimers in the
application forms of Sears, Roebuck & Company. See, e.g., Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Ringwelkski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.
Mich. 1985); Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App. 137, 387 N.W.2d 842 (1985); see also Carpenter v. American
Excelsior Co., 650 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (noting that the employee was asked
to execute the employment application containing a disclaimer "for a purpose; to memorialize
the most significant term of employment-that is, that he was subject to termination at will.").
195. 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986).
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tiff-employees signed applications before they were hired which
stated, in pertinent part:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules
and regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment
and compensation can be terminated with or without cause, and
with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the
Company or myself. I understand that no store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president or

vice president of the Company, has any authority to enter into any
agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or to
make any agreement contrary to the foregoing. 9
1 7
The employees claimed they were terminated without good cause,
and subsequent to their discharge, instituted suits alleging wrongful
discharge. 198 The basis of their claims was that they had legitimate
expectations of "just cause" terminations as a result of assurances
from low level superiors and an employee handbook which listed a
number of reasons for termination.199 The district court granted
summary judgment motions made by the employers against each of
the plaintiffs,2 00 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.20' In its analysis, the
Sixth Circuit posited that the previously quoted language in each
employee's application was unequivocal. 202 The court further posited
that "[s]ince the acknowledgement should be obtained from prospective employees, Sears properly included this provision of employment
in the application form rather than in some documents to be signed
by the employee after he or she was hired. ' 203 The court concluded
by holding that the terms of the application, which were acknowledged as the conditions of employment with the employer, subsequently became terms of the employment relationship. 204

196. Id. at 456.
197. Id. at 455-56. The employer claimed that the employees had violated company
policy, but the employees argued that they were fired for improper reasons, such as the implementation of a policy of replacing higher paid full-time employees with lower paid part-time
employees. See id. at 458.
198. Id. at 455.
199. Id. at 456-57. The plaintiffs claimed that the listing of reasons for termination
created an expectation that an employee could only be fired for one of those reasons or other
good cause. Id. at 457. The court, however, rejected this argument. See id. at 460.
200. Id. at 455.
201. Id. at 462.
202. Id. at 461.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 462. The court further stated that "[h]aving obtained such an acknowledgement from each of the plaintiffs when they were prospective employees, Sears had done all
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The Disclaimer and Other Contradictory Employer
Statements

The use of the disclaimer is an effective means of defining the

terms of the employment relationship. Other employer statements
that contradict the disclaimer, however, may act to negate and override the disclaimer." 5 Such a result may occur since the terms of the

employment relationship that are inconsistent, and thus ambiguous,
become subject to interpretation as questions of law or questions of
fact.2 06 Furthermore, a presumption exists that ambiguous contract
terms will be resolved against the party choosing the words of the
contract. 0 7

Communications containing statements that have overcome disclaimers have included employee policy manuals 208 and oral assurances.20 9 Examples of statements that have overrun disclaimers to

the contrary are detailed grievance or disciplinary procedures to be
taken before discharge 210 and exclusive lists of reasons for discharge. 2 1' Moreover, statements espousing job security, permanent,
that was required to create contracts for employment at will." Id.
205. See Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (noting that disclaimers are effective "if not contradicted by other statements ....").
But see Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (finding
that where an application contained a disclaimer, "there [was] no way that the plaintiff could
reasonably have had a legitimate expectation of a right to" that which was disclaimed).
206. Thegeneral rule is that construction of a contract will be a question of law; however, if extrinsic evidence is introduced, then it is a question of fact. J. CALAMARI & 1 PERILLO, supra note 120, § 3-14, at 174.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
559, at 262 (1960).
208. See, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987); Brooks v.
TWA, 574 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo. 1983); Loffa v. Intel Corp., 153 Ariz. 539, 738 P.2d 1146
(Ct. App. 1987); Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 99 A.D.2d 675, 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (4th
Dep't 1984); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); Alexander v.
Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985).
209. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307
(1981); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 10, 472 N.E.2d 765, 775 (1984). But see
Ware v. Prudential Ins. Co., 220 N.J. Super. 135, 144, 531 A.2d 757, 761 (App. Div. 1987)
(holding that "plaintiff may not avoid the explicit terms of his written employment contract by
asserting that oral assurances of job security, inconsistent with the contract, were given to him
when it was executed.").
210. See, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987); Loffa v. Intel
Corp., 153 Ariz. 539, 738 P.2d 1146 (Ct. App. 1987); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154,
368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); see also Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987)
(finding that a guarantee of fair, honest, and respectful treatment in employee manual prevents summary dismissal of employees' suit for wrongful termination).
211. See, e.g., Aiello v. United Air Lines, 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987); Alexander v.
Phillips Oil Co., 707 P.2d 1385 (Wyo. 1985).
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continuous, or future employment, and statements speaking of salary
in specific periodic terms, may be found to override disclaimers defining the employment relationship as terminable at the will of either
party. 12 In addition, disclaimers may be overcome by contradictory
employment practices. 1 3
Although it has been stated that "the Lord gave, and the Lord

hath taken away,"2 14 the employer should not expect equivalent freedom when extending promises and then attempting to use a disclaimer to disavow them.215 Hence, the prudent employer should
avoid such contradictions in communications to its employees. Employers should review communications given to employees with a
sensitivity to this consideration. In addition, the disclaimer should
include a clause which limits the scope of persons who have the authority to alter the terms of the disclaimer.216 This practice is consonant with traditional agency law precepts. Indeed, the Restatement
(Second) of Agency states that "[i]f a person dealing with an agent
has notice that the agent's authority is created or described in a
writing which is intended for his inspection, he is affected by limitations upon the authority contained in the writing ....,21 7 It may be

surmised, therefore, that if the scope of persons who may modify the
terms of a disclaimer is limited, statements made by other persons
contrary to a disclaimer will have no effect.2 18 The district court ap212. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307
(1981); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984).
213. See, e.g., Loffa v. Intel Corp., 153 Ariz. 539, 544, 738 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Ct. App.
1987); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383, 710 P.2d 1025,
1038 (1985) (finding that "[t]he employer's course of conduct" may provide evidence of modification of an at-will agreement). But see MacDougal v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 624 F. Supp.
756, 759 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that "[e]ven where part of the manual may be considered to give rise to a definitive guarantee based on past practices of the company, a manual
will not necessarily be treated as a contract if specific language within the manual disclaims
certain guarantees.").
214. Job 1:21.
215. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text (detailing situations where courts
have allowed an employer's promise to override a disclaimer).
216. A number of employers in reported cases have taken this precaution. See, e.g., Reid
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986) (limiting authority to alter disclaimer
to president or vice president); Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985)
(limiting authority to alter disclaimer to executive officers); Link v. K-Mart Corp., 689 F.
Supp. 982 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (limiting authority to alter disclaimer to vice president of personnel); Ledl v. Quick Pik Food Stores, Inc., 133 Mich. App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984) (limiting authority to alter disclaimer to president); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d
843 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (limiting authority to alter disclaimer to officers).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 167 (1958).
218. See Reid, 790 F.2d at 460-61 (finding the disclaimer effective where "there was no
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plied this principle in Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.219 In
Batchelor, the employee executed an employment application con-

taining a disclaimer which disavowed termination for cause. 220 The
disclaimer also limited the authority to modify its terms to the presi-

dent or vice president of the employer, Sears.2 21 The employee was
discharged without cause and subsequently commenced a wrongful
discharge action claiming that the no cause provision of her employment contract was modified by the alleged statements of her former

manager.222 The court rejected this claim, noting that "even if the
representations of the manager could be understood as a modifica-

tion of the no cause provisions of the contract, Sears would not be
bound because the manager was without authority to make any such
modification. 22 a
D. Modification of Existing Employer Statements to Include
Disclaimers
The issue arises as to whether existing employer statements may
be modified to include disclaimers. Where the employer has reserved
the right to modify statements promulgated to its employees, disclaimers will be effective where they are subsequently added to these
statements. 22 4 This is a persuasive reason as to why the employer
showing that the handbook had been written or approved by the president or a vice-president
of Sears."); Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(finding that representations of employee's former manager are not effective where "the terms
of plaintiff's employment contract preclude modification except by the president or vice-president of the company."); Eliel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Mich. App. 137, 140, 387 N.W.2d
842, 844 (1985) (holding that the disclaimer was effective in circumstances where the
"[pilaintiff does not contend that any statements [contrary to the disclaimer] were made by
the president or vice president of Sears."); see also Shelby v. Zayre Corp., 474 So. 2d 1069,
1070 (Ala. 1985) (finding that statements allegedly made by assistant manager contrary to
disclaimer do not override disclaimer since plaintiff could not have relied on alleged statements
of the assistant manager to her detriment in face of the disclaimer).
Employers have attempted to utilize clauses which limit the means by which the disclaimer may be altered, such as by requiring modifications to be in writing. Such clauses,
however, are not likely to be effective since it is established that "contracting parties cannot
today restrict their power to contract with each other tomorrow." J. CALAMARI & J. PFRILLO,
supra note 120, § 5-14(b), at 264; accord E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 114, § 7.6, at 475.
219. 574 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
220. Id. at 1483.
221. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 196 (quoting the disclaimer used by
Sears in its employment applications).
222. 574 F. Supp. at 1482.
223. Id. at 1486.
224. See, e.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987) (stating
that "[t]he handbook provided to [the employee] at the commencement of his employment
noted that [the employer's] personnel policies and handbook could change."); Brookshaw v.
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should reserve the right to modify its statements-even if it does not
now choose to include disclaimers.

More difficult problems arise, however, where the employer has
not reserved the right to modify statements promulgated to its employees. Disclaimers that alter non-promissory statements are not
likely to be challenged. In contrast is the situation in which the employer now attempts to disclaim that which it had previously
promised.
Courts have recognized that employers may modify statements
they have made concerning the employment relationship 22 5 -at least

to the extent that such alterations do not interfere with accrued
rights. 28 In jurisdictions enforcing promissory statements by employers through equitable principles, statements that are modified
before an employee is terminated will be held to give the employee
no legitimate expectation to that which is disclaimed.227 In jurisdicSouth St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that if the
employer "chooses to modify its existing policies, a new unilateral contract is offered, and an
employee can signify acceptance by remaining on the job." (citation omitted)); see also Shaver
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that seniority
rights may be modified where the right to modify has been reserved), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1361
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988).
225. See, e.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987); Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198-99 (E.D. Va. 1987); Barry Gilberg,
1987); Leathem v. Research Found.
Ltd. v. Craftex Corp., 665 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (N.D. I11.
of City Univ. of New York, 658 F. Supp. 651, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Shaver v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988); Bartinikas v. Clarklift of Chicago N., Inc., 508 F. Supp.
1981); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 734-35
959, 960-61 (N.D. I11.
(Ala. 1987); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 N.W.2d 880,
892 (1980); Farrell v. Automobile Club, 155 Mich. App. 378, 391, 399 N.W.2d 531, 538
(1986); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983); Brookshaw v.
South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Helle v. Landmark,
Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 13, 472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (1984); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d
524, 527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). Contra King v. Hospital Care Corp., No. 1-85-I, slip op.
at 5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 13, 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio library, App file) (finding that after employment has begun employer "could not thereafter by amendment unilaterally change the
condition of the implied employment contract.").
226. See Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 13, 472 N.E.2d 765, 777 (1984);
Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976); see also Woolley v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 309, 491 A.2d 1257, 1270-71 (concluding that employer may change terms and conditions of employment specified in employee manual but not
addressing whether such changes may "adversely affect binding job security provision."), modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
227. See, e.g., Leathern v. Research Found. of City Univ. of New York, 658 F. Supp.
651, 654-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579,
619, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980) (asserting that where policies are subject to unilateral
changes by the employer, the employee would "have no legitimate expectation that any partic-
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tions enforcing promissory statements by employers through traditional contract principles, employers who modify their statements
will be considered to recast the terms upon which the employment
relationship will be maintained in the future. "2 8

Courts utilizing traditional contract principles have provided
guidance regarding how an employer may effectively amend its
statements to include, for example, disclaimers. 2 9 An employer must

give its employees notice of the modification.230 In addition, the modification should be unambiguous regarding, for instance, the employees to whom the new or changed term is intended to apply.2"'

Courts have explained that where employees continue to work
after they become aware of the applicable changed condition, acceptance of the modification is inferred, and the modification may
23
subsequently be enforced.23 2 For example, in Lee v. Sperry Corp.,
ular policy will continue to remain in force.").
228. See, e.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987); Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198-99 (E.D. Va. 1987); Barry Gilberg,
Ltd. v. Craftex Corp., 665 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Bartinikas v. Clarklift of
Chicago N., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 959, 960-61 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 734-35 (Ala. 1987); Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381
N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976); see also Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983) (finding that "[b]y preparing and distributing its handbook, the employer chooses, in
essence, either to implement or modify its existing contracts with all employees covered by the
handbook.").
229. See, e.g., Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d I, 472 N.E.2d 765; see also
Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198-99 (E.D. Va. 1987) (indicating that an employer should take affirmative steps to ensure that employees are made aware of
the new policy and that they understand the terms of the policy); Barry Gilberg, Ltd. v.
Craftex Corp., 665 F. Supp. 585, 595 (N.D. I11.1987) (finding that employees should be given
an opportunity to reject the modification, and if they fail to do so, they will be bound by it, but
if they do reject the modification, employers are free to fire them).
230. See Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 13, 472 N.E.2d at 777 (requiring "legally adequate
notice" to employees for any modification of statements concerning the employment
relationship).
231. See Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop.. 409 N.W.2d 87, 89 (N.D. 1987) (reversing
summary judgment for employer where issue of material fact existed as to whether disclaimer
placed in a subsequently promulgated handbook was "intended to apply to existing employees
...
.").
232. See, e.g., Shaver v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 669 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D. Wis. 1986),
aff'd, 840 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988); Brookshaw v. South St.
Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d
524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976). As one jurist posited, the employer may:
augment, modify and even withdraw the offer contained in the handbook in response
to the employer's changing needs and circumstances. When an employer distributes
a new handbook or portion thereof, the employer makes a new offer of employment.
The terms of the new offer are defined by the contents of the new handbook, and the
new offer becomes effective on the date the new handbook is distributed. Or, when a
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an employee, Lee, received at the commencement of his employment
an employee handbook and personnel procedures which contained
certain procedures pertaining to employment termination. 34 Several
months later, Lee received a revised employee handbook which contained the following disclaimer:
Neither the offer and acceptance of employment or [sic] the establishment and maintenance of operating policies and procedures by
the Company create a contract of employment except as might be
approved in writing by the Sperry Univac Vice President, Human
Resources. Although it is intended that the relationship between
Sperry Univac and its employees will grow and be in the best interests of both the employee and the company, the relationship is terminable at any time at the will of either the employee or the company, and without the need to indicate a specific reason or cause. 35
In 1985, Lee was laid off without being afforded any of the termination procedures outlined in the original manual he received
when his employment commenced. 36 Lee subsequently filed an action alleging that the employer breached his employment contract by
not adhering to those procedures.2"' The employer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the employee's claim was invalidated by the disclaimer included in the revised handbook. 38 Applying the law of a state which utilizes traditional contract principles to
enforce employer statements, the district court recognized that an
employment relationship based upon a unilateral contract can be
modified. 39 The court noted that although other courts have been
asked to enforce employer statements which promise other than atwill employment, "the principle seems equally applicable to the ophandbook is withdrawn, i.e. revoked, the new offer becomes effective on the date
that the employer notifies the employee of the revocation of the handbook. Employees accept the new offer and provide consideration by continuing their employment.
Banas v. Matthews Int'l Corp., 348 Pa. Super. 464, 503, 502 A.2d 637, 657 (1985) (Beck, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. 678 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Minn. 1987).
234. Id. at 1417-18.
235. Id. at 1417.
236. See id. at 1416, 1418.
237. See id. at 1417-18. Lee also claimed that his termination violated the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. Id. at 1416-17.
238. Id. at 1418. The revised handbook was subsequently amended to include more limiting language. See id. at 1417-18. Although it is disputed whether Lee ever received the final
modification, the court deemed this immaterial since Lee admitted receiving the revised handbook. Id. at 1418 n.3.
239. Id. at 1418.
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posite transformation."240 After examining the facts of Lee, the
court held that the explicit disclaimer was effective in negating the
employee's claim and granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment.2 41 In support of its conclusion, the court reasoned that
Lee's unilateral contract-based claim was eliminated by modification
of his employment contract since the new limiting language was
added to the handbook and he continued to work for over three years
thereunder.242
Other courts, however, have shown more concern about the requirement that the employee assent to a new or changed term in
order for it to become a part of the employment contract. 43 For
example, in Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co.,244 Thompson
was hired in 1977 by Taft Broadcasting Corporation and in 1980
was given an Employees Manual (the 1980 Manual) which defined a
dismissal as "'a separation initiated by [the employer] for
cause.' 245 Taft's business was acquired by Kings in 1984.246 In July

1985, the new employer issued an Employment Handbook (the 1985
Handbook), which it had drafted.2 47 Thompson received the 1985
Handbook which contained a disclaimer stating that either the employer or the employee "'may terminate [the] employment at any
time with or without cause and with or without notice.' ",248 In August 1985, Thompson's employment was terminated, and he subse-9
24
quently filed an action alleging that he was wrongfully discharged.
Specifically, Thompson claimed that the disclaimer in the 1985
Handbook providing for an at-will employment relationship had no
effect and that the 1980 Manual's "for cause" provision should
therefore govern. 250 The employer subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment.2 51 The district court noted that the provisions
240. Id. (construing Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198-99 (E.D.
Va. 1987), discussed infra notes 244-55 and accompanying text; Barry Gilberg, Ltd. v. Craftex
Corp., 665 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (N.D. II. 1987) (permitting the employee to reject the modification and continue employment); Bartinikas v. Clarklift of Chicago N., Inc., 508 F. Supp.
959, 961 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same).
244. 674 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Va. 1987).
245. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added) (quoting the 1980 Manual distributed by Taft).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. (quoting the 1985 Handbook distributed by Kings).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1196.
251. Id. at 1195.
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contained in the 1985 Handbook constituted an offer which would
govern the terms of the relationship if the terms of the offer were
accepted by the employee. 52 The court rejected the contention, however, that mere awareness of the new terms and continuation of work
could be considered an acceptance. 53 Rather, the court held that
there must be specific evidence showing that the employee "understood the 1985 Handbook's terms to be controlling ...

"

Since

the employer did not provide such evidence, the court denied its motion for summary judgment.2 55 As a result of Thompson and similar
cases, the prudent employer should receive from its employees a formal acknowledgment of any newly included disclaimer or other modification in its statements to the employees.
V.

CONCLUSION

The number of recently instituted wrongful termination actions
has grown considerably.2 58 Many of these actions concern disputes
over the terms of the employment relationship. This Article has suggested that employers should utilize disclaimers as a means to define
the terms of the employment relationship and has proposed certain
guidelines to help ensure the effectiveness of the disclaimers. Although the law pertaining to disclaimers in the employment context
is in its formative stages, it is clear that the utilization of disclaimers
will promote more certainty and equity in the employment relationship. Hence, the effective utilization of disclaimers will undoubtedly
yield positive consequences for both the employer and the employee.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 1198.
Id. at 1198-99.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX

STATE RECOGNITION OF LIMITATIONS TO THE
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL RULE*
STATE

ALABAMA

ALASKA

ARIZONA

ARKANSAS

CALIFORNIA

COLORADO

CONNECTICUT

IMPLIED

PUBLIC POLICY

GOOD FAITH &

CONTRACT

EXCEPTION

FAIR DEALING

YES

NO

YES

Hoffman-La Roche,
Williams v. Killough,
Inc. v. Campbell, 512
474 So. 2d 680 (Ala.
So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987) 1985)

Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. v. Campbell, 512
So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987)

YES

YES

YES

Eales v. Tanana Valley
Medical-Surgical
Group, Inc., 663 P.2d
958 (Alaska 1983)

Knight v. American
Guard & Alert, Inc.,
714 P.2d 788 (Alaska
1986)

Mitford v. de Lasala,
666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska
1983)

YES

YES

YES

Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141
Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (1984)

Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial
Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370,
710 P.2d 1025 (1985)

Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial
Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370,
710 P.2d 1025 (1985)

YES

YES

NO

Gladden v. Arkansas
Children's Hosp., 292
Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d
501 (1987)

Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Oxford, 294 Ark. 239,
743 S.W.2d 380 (1988)

Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Serv., Inc.,
548 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Ark. 1982)

YES

YES

YES

Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d
311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981)

Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal.
3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980)

Cleary v. American
Airlines, IIl Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (1980)

YES

YES

NO

Continental Air Lines
v. Keenan, 731 P.2d
708 (Colo. 1987)

Lampe v. Presbyterian
Medical Center, 41
Colo. App. 465, 590
P.2d 513 (1978)

Pittman v. Larson
Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d
1379 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986)

YES

YES

YES

Finley v. Aetna Life & Sheets v. Teddy's
Cas. Co., 202 Conn.
Frosted Foods, Inc.,
190, 520 A.2d 208
179 Conn. 471, 427
(1987)
A.2d 385 (1980)

*

Magnan v. Anaconda
Indus., Inc., 193 Conn.
558, 479 A.2d 781
(1984)

In the absence of dispositive state law, federal cases construing state law have been
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NO

UNRESOLVED

UNRESOLVED

NO

YES

NO

Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp., 427 So.
2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)

Smith v. Piezo
Technology &
Professional Adm'rs,
427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1983)

Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corp., 427 So.
2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983)

NO

NO

NO

Heideck v. Kent Gen.
Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095
(Del. 1982)
FLORIDA

GEORGIA

Garmon v. Health
Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Bendix Corp. v.
Group of Atlanta, Inc., Ga. App. 139, 342
Flowers, 174 Ga. App.
183 Ga. App. 587, 359 S.E.2d 484 (1986)
620, 330 S.E.2d 769
S.E.2d 450 (1987)
(1985)
HAWAII

IDAHO

ILLINOIS

INDIANA

IOWA

YES

YES

NO

Kinoshita v. Canadian
Parnar v. Americana
Pac. Airlines, 724 P.2d Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw.
110 (Haw. 1986)
370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982)

Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw.
370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982)

YES

YES

NO

Harkness v. City of
Burley, 110 Idaho 353,
715 P.2d 1283 (1986)

MacNeil v. Minidoka
Memorial Hosp., 108
Idaho 588, 701 P.2d
208 (1985)

Holmes v. Union Oil
Co., 760 P.2d 1189
(Idaho Ct. App. 1988)

YES

YES

NO

Duldulao v. Saint Mary Kelsay v. Motorola,
of Nazareth Hosp.
Inc., 74 III. 2d 172,
Center, 115 III. 2d 482, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978)
505 N.E.2d 314 (1987)

Hugo v. Tomaszewski,
155 Ill. App. 3d 906,
508 N.E.2d 1139
(1987)

NO

YES

NO

Shaw v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 167 Ind. App. I,
328 N.E.2d 775 (1975)

Frampton v. Central
Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973)

Hamblen v. Danners,
Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985)

YES

YES

UNRESOLVED

Cannon v. National By- Abrisz v. Pulley
Prods., Inc., 422
Freight Lines, 270
N.W.2d 638 (Iowa
N.W.2d 454 (Iowa
1988)
1978)
KANSAS

YES

YES

Morriss v. Coleman
Anco Constr. Co. v.
Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 Freeman, 236 Kan.
P.2d 841 (1987)
626, 693 P.2d 1183

NO
Morriss v. Coleman
Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738
P.2d 841 (1987)

(1985)
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KENTUCKY

YES

YES

[Vol. 17:365
NO

Shah v. American
Firestone Textile Co. v. Wyant v. SCM Corp.,
Synthetic Rubber
Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 692 S.W.2d 814 (Ky.
Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 730 (Ky. 1983)
Ct. App. 1985)
(Ky. 1983)
LOUISIANA

MAINE

MARYLAND

MASSACHUSETTS

MICHIGAN

MINNESOTA

MISSISSIPPI

MISSOURI

UNRESOLVED

YES

YES

NO

Turner v. Winn Dixie,
Inc., 474 So. 2d 966
(La. Ct. App. 1985)

Frichter v. National
Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 620 F. Supp. 922
(E.D. La. 1985)

UNRESOLVED

NO

Larrabee v. Penobscott Pooler v. Maine Coal
Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 Prods., 532 A.2d 1026
A.2d 97 (Me. 1984)
(Me. 1987)

DeSalle v. Key Bank,
685 F. Supp. 282 (D.
Me. 1988)

YES

YES

NO

Staggs v. Blue Cross,
61 Md. App. 381, 486
A.2d 798 (1985)

Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 291
Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464
(1981)

Borowski v. Vitro
Corp., 634 F. Supp.
252 (D. Md. 1986)

YES

YES

YES

Garrity v. Valley View
Nursing Home, Inc., 10
Mass. App. Ct. 423,
406 N.E.2d 423 (1980)

DeRose v. Putnam
Management Co., 398
Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d
428 (1986)

Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 373
Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977)

YES

YES

NO

Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980)

Suchodolski v.
Michigan Consol. Gas
Co., 412 Mich. 692,
316 N.W.2d 710
(1982)

Cockels v. International
Business Expositions,
Inc., 159 Mich. App.
30, 406 N.W.2d 465
(1987)

YES

YES

NO

Pine River State Bank
v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn.
1983)

Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., 408
N.W.2d 569 (Minn.
1987)

Hunt v. IBM Mid
America Employees
Fed. Credit Union, 384
N.W.2d 853 (Minn.
1986)

YES

YES

UNRESOLVED

Robinson v. Board of
Laws v. Aetna Fin.
Trustees of E. Cent.
Co., 667 F. Supp. 342
Junior College, 477 So. (N.D. Miss. 1982)
2d 1352 (Miss. 1985)

Robinson v. Board of
Trustees of E. Cent.
Junior College, 477 So.
2d 1352 (Miss. 1985)

NO

YES

NO

Johnson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 745
S.W.2d 661 (Mo.
1988)

Beasley v. Affiliated
Hosp. Prods., 713
S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986)

Neighbors v. Kirksville
College of Osteopathic
Medicine, 694 S.W.2d
822 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985)
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19891
MONTANA

EMPLOYMENT DISCLAIMERS
YES
MONT. CODE ANN.

YES

§

39-2-904(3) (1987)

NEBRASKA

NEVADA

NEW
HAMPSHIRE

NEW JERSEY

NORTH
CAROLINA

Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Gates v. Life of Mont.
Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 Ins. Co., 196 Mont.
(1980)
178, 638 P.2d 1063
(1982)

YES

YES

NO

Johnston v. Panhandle
Coop. Ass'n, 225 Neb.
732, 408 N.W.2d 261
(1987)

Ambroz v. Cornhusker
Square Ltd., 226 Neb.
899, 416 N.W.2d 510
(1987)

Jeffers v. Bishop
Clarkson Memorial
Hosp., 222 Neb. 829,
387 N.W.2d 692
(1986)

YES

YES

YES

Southwest Gas Corp. v. Hanson v. Harrah's,
Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594,
100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d
668 P.2d 261 (1983)
394 (1984)

K Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39,
732 P.2d 1364 (1987)

UNRESOLVED

YES

YES

Howard v. Dorr
Woolen Co., 120 N.H.
295, 414 A.2d 1273
(1980)

Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974)

YES

YES

NO

Woolley v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J.
284, 491 A.2d 1257
(1985)

Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.,
84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d
505 (1980)

McQuitty v. General
Dynamics Corp., 204
N.J. Super. 514, 499
A.2d 526 (App. Div.
1985)

YES

NO

Forrester v. Parker, 93
N.M. 781, 606 P.2d
191 (1980)

Boudar v. EG&G Inc.,
105 N.M. 151, 730
P.2d 454 (1986)

Sanchez v. The New
Mexican, 106 N.M. 76,
738 P.2d 1321 (1987)

YES

YES

NO

Weiner v. McGrawHill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 443 N.E.2d 441,
457 N.Y.S.2d 193
(1982)

N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 1988)

Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 448
N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983)

NO

YES

NO

NEW MEXICO YES

NEW YORK

YES

Harris v. Duke Power Sides v. Duke Univ.,
Walker v. Westinghouse
Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 Elec. Corp., 77 N.C.
S.E.2d 357 (1987)
S.E.2d 818 (1985)
App. 253, 335 S.E.2d
79 (1985)
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[Vol. 17:365

YES

YES

NO

OHIO

Hammond v. North
Dakota State Personnel
Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359
(N.D. 1984)
YES

Krein v. Marian Manor
Nursing Home, 415
N.W.2d 793 (N.D.
1987)
NO

Hillesland v. Federal
Land Bank Ass'n, 407
N.W.2d 206 (N.D.
1987)
NO

OKLAHOMA

Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co., 19 Ohio
St. 3d 150, 483 N.E.2d
150 (1985)
YES

Phung v. Waste
Management, Inc., 23
Ohio St. 3d 100, 491
N.E.2d 1114 (1986)
YES

Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co.. 19 Ohio
St. 3d 150, 483 N.E.2d
150 (1985)
NO

NORTH
DAKOTA

Langdon v. Saga Corp., Webb v. Dayton Tire
& Rubber Co., 697
569 P.2d 524 (Okla.
P.2d 519 (Okla. 1985)
Ct. App. 1976)
OREGON

PENNSYLVANIA

RHODE
ISLAND

SOUTH
DAKOTA

YES

Yartzoff v. DemocraticHerald Publishing Co.,
281 Or. 651, 576 P.2d
356 (1978)
YES

Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975)

DiBonaventura v.
Consolidated Rail
Corp., 372 Pa. Super.
420, 539 A.2d 865
(1988)
UNRESOLVED

Geary v. United States Engstrom v. John
Nuveen & Co., 668 F.
Steel Corp., 456 Pa.
Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa.
171, 319 A.2d 174
1987)
(1974)

YES

YES

YES

YES

NO

NO
Brainard v. Imperial
Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp.
37 (D.R.I. 1983)
NO

Small v. Spring Indus., Ludwick v. This
Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 Minute of Carolina,
Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337
S.E.2d 452 (1987)
S.E.2d 213 (1985)

Satterfield v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co.,
617 F. Supp. 1359
(D.S.C. 1985)

YES

NO

YES

Osterkamp v. Alkota
Many Statutory
Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d Sections
275 (S.D. 1983)
TENNESSEE

UNRESOLVED

YES

Cummins v. EG&G
Roy v. Woonsocket
Inst. for Say., 525 A.2d Sealol, Inc., 690 F.
Supp. 134 (D.R.I.
915 (R.I. 1987)
1988)
SOUTH
CAROLINA

Hinson v. Cameron.
742 P.2d 549 (Okla.
1987)

YES

YES

Hamby v. Genesco,
Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)

Clanton v. Cain-Sloan
Co., 677 S.W. 2d 441
(Tenn. 1984)
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Breen v. Dakota Gear
& Joint Co., 433
N.W.2d 221 (S.D.
1988)
NO
Whittaker v. CareMore, Inc., 621 S.W.2d
395 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981)
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EMPLOYMENT DISCLAIMERS

19891
TEXAS

YES

YES

UTAH

YES

NO
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. McClendon v.
v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757
733 (Tex. 1985)
S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988)
UNRESOLVED
UNRESOLVED

VERMONT

Piacitelli v. Southern
Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah
1981)
YES

YES

Aiello v. United Air
Lines, 818 F.2d 1196
(5th Cir. 1987)

VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON

WEST
VIRGINIA

UNRESOLVED

Sherman v. Rutland
Hosp., Inc., 146 Vt.
204, 500 A.2d 230
(1985)
YES
Thompson v. American
Motor Inns, Inc., 623
F. Supp. 409 (W.D.
Va. 1985)

Payne v. Rozendaal,
147 Vt. 488, 520 A.2d
586 (1986)
YES
Bowman v. State Bank,
229 Va. 534, 331
S.E.2d 797 (1985)

NO
McGreevy v. RacalDana Instruments, Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.
Va. 1988)

YES

YES

NO

Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984)
YES

Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984)
YES

Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081
(1984)
NO

Cook v. Heck's Inc.,
342 S.E.2d 453 (W.
Va. 1988)
WISCONSIN

WYOMING

TOTALS

Harless v. First Nat'l
Speelman v. Smith's
Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, Transfer Corp., No. 85246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)
1883 (4th Cir. May 22,
1986)
YES
YES
NO
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Wis. 2d 154, 368
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d
N.W.2d 666 (1985)
561, 335 N.W.2d 834
561, 335 N.W.2d 834
(1983)
(1983)
YES
NO
UNRESOLVED
Mobil Coal Producing, Allen v. Safeway
Rompf v. John Q.
Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d
Hammons Hotels, Inc.,
702 (Wyo. 1985)
277 (Wyo. 1985)
685 P.2d 25 (Wyo.
1984)
YES - 41
YES - 43
YES - 9
NO - 34
NO - 6
NO - 4
UNRESOLVED
3
UNRESOLVED - 7
UNRESOLVED - 3
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